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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three 
players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. 
Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting 
procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the 
actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives 
to be voted on, i.e. , the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda­
formation game is shown to exist under different assumptions about the 
information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. 
Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain 
features which are attractive from a normative point of view. 
ENDOGENOUS AGENDA FORMATION IN THREE-PERSON COMMITTEES• 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Jeffrey s. Banks and Farid Gasmi 
California Institute of Technology 
In recent years a branch of political science and social 
choice theory has examined the outcomes of voting games where the set 
of alternatives is exogenously determined [Miller (1980), Shepsle and 
Weingast (1984), Banks (1985)]. The actual process by which outcomes 
are arrived at can be seen as encompassing numerous stages prior to 
this final (voting) stage; however, in the spirit of dynamic 
programming, to solve for this larger game one must solve these stages 
recursively. For one common rule (amendment procedure) and one 
behavioral assumption (sophisticated voting), the solution to this 
final stage for any finite set of alternatives is well established 
[cf. the citations above]. Given this, a next logical step would be 
to study the determination of the set of alternatives under these 
assumptions. This paper makes a modest contribution to such a task. 
We analyze a 3-person voting game where two or three players 
have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Given the 
set of alternatives and the order in which they will be voted on, the 
players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the game reduces to the 
choice of the alternatives given their place in the voting procedure. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
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structure of preferences in the voting game; Section 3 presents the 
different methods for choosing alternatives as well as the different 
assumptions on the information possessed in regard to the order of the 
alternatives to be considered. Section 4 characterizes the solutions 
to the games along with certain interesting geometric properties of 
the solutions. An explicit characterization of the main solution 
concept is contained in the Appendix as are the proofs of two of the 
theorems. Finally, some concluding remarks are contained in section 
s. 
2. NOTATION, DEFINITIONS, ASSUMPTIONS 
Consider a voting game consisting of a set I of players, I II 
3, an alternative set X c JRn which includes the Pareto optimal 
points, and assume that each player has euclidean preferences over X: 
where xi constitutes i's ideal point. Note that with three players 
the set of Pareto optimal points is simply a 2-dimensional surface. 
We say that x is ma1ority-preferred to y, xPy, iff 
and define P: X � � X as P (y) = (x s X: xPyJ. Thus, P (y) is the 
set of points majority-preferred to y. 
We assume that a status quo point either does not exist, or is 
sufficiently distant from the Pareto surface. 
and T 
Given a finite set of points B; CX1, • • •  , Xt} £ X with IBI 
(1, 2, • • •  , t} ,  define an agenda as an element of 
d T � T and d is 1 - 1} ; 
t 
thus A is the set of all permutations of B. Letting yi; xd(i)' we 
assume that voting follows an amendment procedure, where for a given 
A c A an aggregate decision rule is arrived at by: i) comparing Yt 
and Yt-l via the majority preference relation; ii) comparing the 
preferred alternative to Yt_2, etc. After the t - 1 pairwise 
comparisons the remaining alternative is declared the voting outcome. 
We further assume that voters adopt sophisticated voting strategies; 
cf. Farquharson (1960), [A complete description of sophisticated 
voting under an amendment procedure can be found in Shepsle and 
Weingast (1984).J 
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Given that the outcome of this voting game is well defined for 
any finite set of. alternatives [Banks (1985)), we focus our attention 
on the game describing the choice of alternatives to be voted on, with 
the corresponding payoffs from the subsequent voting game. 
3. GAME FORMS AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
3,1 1-Amendment Games 
In the 1-amendment game, two players choose alternatives to be 
considered, a bill and ·an amendment (though these terms lose much of 
their content without restrictions on the set of alternatives labeled 
"amendments" to a particular "bill"). Two different assumptions on 
the information available to the bill proposer will be examined. In 
the certainty case, the player proposing the bill knows the identity 
of the player proposing the amendment; in the uncertainty case, this 
identity is unknown. Let player i propose a bill xi and, after xi is 
announced, j proposes an amendment xj, The strategy space for both i 
and j is simply X; however, j knows that if xj does not beat xi, xi 
will be the outcome. Hence we define j's effective strategy space as 
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P(xi). Note that there is no need to incorporate sophisticated voting 
in the 1-amendment game; players simply vote for their preferred 
alternative from the set {xi, xj} .  A (pure) strategy for i is an
element of X, while a (pure) strategy for j is a function xj : X �  x. 
3, 2 i-Amendment Games 
Here all three players choose alternatives, with i choosing 
the bill, j the first amendment, and k the second amendment. Again we 
examine the certainty case, where i knows the order of the players 
proposing amendments, and the uncertainty case, where this order is 
·not known by i. In the voting game, xj is paired with xk' with the 
majority-preferred alternative paired against xi; hence the assumption 
of sophisticated voting has a measurable effect. Suppose xj is 
offered prior to xk; the effective strategy space for j is still
P(xi), while for k, the effective strategy space is P(xi) n P(xj),
since for xk to be the voting outcome it must be that xkPxi and xkPxj. 
In the 2-amendment game, (pure) strategies are defined as above for i 
and j, while for k a strategy is a function xk : X X X � X. 
3.3 Solution Concepts 
In the spirit of sophisticated behavior and, more generally, 
dynamic programming, the equilibrium concept we employ in the 
certainty case is a modification of the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Given that the player putting forward the last amendment chooses from 
his effective strategy space, we define a Stackelberg equilibrium (in 
• • • the 2-amendment game with certainty) as (xi, xj(• ), xk (• , • )), where 
Since P (xi) and P (xj) are open sets, however, this concept might not 
be well defined, Thus we define an s-Stackelberg equilibrium as a 
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Thus, if the strategies imply payoffs within s of the highest 
(supremum) payoff, for small (fixed) s, we will call the, strategies an 
e-Stackelberg equilibrium. 
In the uncertainty case, we assume that player i (the bill 
proposer) adopts a modification of a minimax strategy where (for the 
• 2-amendment game) xi is i's minimax strategy if 
• • where xj (xi, xk (xi)) is the outcome when k chooses the first amendment 
and j the second amendment. Again we define an s-approximation to the 
• • • minimax strategy; we say that (xi;xj{• ), xk (• , • ) is an e-minimax-
Stackelberg equilibrium if j and k adopt e-Stackelberg strategies and 
• i adopts a minimax strategy such that the payoff to i from xi is 
within s of the highest (supremum) possible. 
4. SOLUTIONS TO THE UNDERLYING GAMES 
In section 3 we have described four different games ; we seek 
now to characterize their solutions. We propose a point that we 
denote by M• in the paper, which will turn out to be either the 
limiting outcome itself in the sense defined above or else closely 
related to it, for each of the four games. In this latter case, it 
follows that the limiting outcome can easily be found starting from 
This section contains two parts. The first part (4,1) 
introduces the point M•. The aim there is to make the reader familiar 
with the geometric properties of this point. We describe the 
procedure by which we construct the point M• and show that in fact it 
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is the intersection of three well-defined curves. In section 1 of the 
Appendix we give the mathematical equations of these curves. 
The second part of this section (4.2) contains the main 
results. The proofs of Theorem 1. 2 and Theorem 3.1 are given 
respectively in section 2. 1 and section 2. 2 of the Appendix. 
4.1.1 Construction and Existence of M• 
First we construct the locus of points M1, denoted by Hi as
follows: we draw an arbitrary indifference curve for voter 1, which 
intersects the two contract curves x1x2 and x2x3 in, respectively I12 
and I13, say. We then draw voter 2's and voter 3's indifference 
curves which contain respectively I12 and I13• Finally, we find the 
intersection M1 of these two curves inside the Pareto set, if it 
exists. See Figures 1. 1 and 1.2. Note that for any such point M1 we 
have: 
or eq,uivalently: 
Let d(x1, x3> - d(x1, x2) = K1• The locus of points Hl is then 
characterized by the equation: 
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(1) 
This merely says that Hi is a subset of the locus of points, 
the difference of whose numerical distances from two fixed points 
(namely x2 and x3) is a constant (+K1 or -K1). This is by definition 
the hyperbola H1 say, whose foci are x
2 and x3• Note that the point 
x1 (voter l's ideal point) satisfies equation (1) and hence belongs to 
Hi · Consequently Hi is the piece of the hyperbola H1 contained in the 
Pareto set and containing x1• Indeed, the intersection of Hi and the 
contract curve x2x3 can easily be found, Such a point, I, satisfies 
(1). So, 
On the other hand since I lies on the contract curve x2x3 we have: 
d(x3, I) = d(x2, x3) - d(x2, I). Thus,
( 2) 
In a similar fashion, starting from voter 2's and voter 3's 
ideal points, x2 and x3, respectively, we construct the loci of points 
M2 and M3 denoted respectively by H; and H; . The locus H; is 
characterized by the equation: 
where, K2 = d(x
2, x3) - d(x1, x2), whereas H; is characterized by the 
equation: 
5 --��������������..::::. x
FIGURE 1.1 A POINT Ml OF THE LOCUS H1 
--���t-�����������x 
FIGURE 1.2 CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOCUS OF POINTS H1 
5 
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(4) 
where, K3 = d(x
2, x3) - d(x1, x3). 
For similar reasons as for Hi, the locus H2 is the piece of 
the hyperbola whose foci are x1 and x3, contained in the Pareto set 
and containing x2• The point of H2 on the contract curve x1x3(H) is 
characterized by: 
d(x1, H) ( 5) 
The locus H3 is the piece of the hyperbola whose foci are x1 
and x2, contained in the Pareto set and containing the point x3• 
intersection of H3 and the contract curve x1x3 (the point G) is 
characterized by: 
The 
( 6) 
Proposition 1: There exists a unique point M• in the Pareto set such 
that: 
Proof: 
As already seen Hi and H2 are pieces of hyperbolas, contained 
in the Pareto set which is the area of the triangle x1x2x3• The locus 
Hl contains the vertex x1 and the point I on the opposite side x2x3 
whereas H2 contains the vertex x2 and the point H on the side x1x3• 
It follows that these two loci intersect in a unique point. Call M• 
this point. Now, since H3 is also a piece of a hyperbola, in order to 
prove the proposition, it suffices to show that M• e tt3. Since 
. -M e H1 we have by (1): 
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( 7) 
• Similarly M 8 H2, BO that by (3): 
Subtracting (7) from (8) we obtain: 
or 
. -which says that M e H2 (see (4)), 
( 8) 
Q,E, D. 
To summarize, we have coruitructed three loci Hi, H2 and H3 
which as seen are pieces of hyperbolas, and have a unique common point 
inside the Pareto set, M•. Figure 2 visualizes this point. The 
reader is referred to section 1 of the Appendix for a complete 
mathematical characterization of M•. There, the equations of the 
complete hyperbolas, of which Hi, H2 and H3 are subsets, are given 
with respect to a simple system of coordinates. Therefore, given the 
three voters' ideal points x1, x2, and x3, the point M• of interest 
can easily be found. 
' 
' 
' 
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' 
' 
' 
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FIGURE 2: 
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' 
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Next, we observe that M• displays a nice geometric property 
which as we shall see is the basis of the proofs of our main results. 
4. 1.2 Geometric Properties of M•: 
Draw the indifference curves of the three voters going through 
the point M• and find the well-known area constituted by the three 
leaves (1,2), (1,3) and (2,3) of points that get a simple majority 
against M•, i. e. , P(M•), These indifference curves intersect the 
three contract curves x1x2, x1x3 and x2x3 in the set of points 
{ A,B,C,D,E,F} , See Figure 3. 
Proposition z_: 
dCx1,B) = d(x1,c). ( 9) 
d(x2,A> = d(x2,F), (10) 
d(x3,E) = dCx3,D). 
M• • 
-
( ) Proof: Since � H1 we have by 1 : 
3 • 2 • 1 3 1 2 d(x ,M ) - d(x ,M ) = K1 • d(x ,x ) - d(x ,x ) <=> 
d(x1,B) = d(x1,c). 
(11) 
FIGURE 3: A GEOMETRIC PROPERTY OF THE POINT M
* 
5 
x 
In a similar fashion, 
since M• e H;, by (3): d(x2,A) = d(x2,F) and
since M• e H3, by (4): d(x3,E) = d(x3,D),
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Q,E,D, 
An immediate consequence of this proposition is the following, 
Corollary 1: 
d(A,B) = d(C,D) = d(E,F), (12) 
Proof: from the previous proposition, d(x1,B) = d(x1,C). On the
other hand, d(x1,A) = d(x1,D), Thus d(A,B) = d(C,D), From d(x2,A)
d(x2,F) and d(x2,B) = d(x2,E) we have, d(A,B) = d(E,F),
Q,E . D. 
Next we see that the three points I, H, G which are 
respectively Hl 0 x2x3, H; 0 x1x3 and H; 0 x1x2 exhibit also a nice
geometric property. See Figure 4 .  
Proposition !: 
d(x1,G) = d(x1,H).
d(x2,G) = d(x2,I),
d(x3,I) = d(x3,H).
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
' 
' 
' ' ' ' .. \ ' . 
' 
' 
I 
I 
' 
\ 
FIGURE 4: A GEOMETRIC PROPERTY OF THE POINTS 
- 1 2 - 1 3 - 2 3 G = H3 n x x ' H = Hz n x x AND I = Hl 
n x x 
Proof: we have seen in (S) that d (x
1, H> = (d (x1, x3> - K2)/2. 
Substituting for the expression of K2 this can be rewritten as: 
13 
d (x2, x3) - Kl 2 ---
2
--= = d (x , I). 
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Q.E,D. 
From proposition 3, it follows that there exists a triple of 
indifference curves of respectively voter 1,2 and 3, say cs1,s2,s3)
such that: s1 and s2 are tangent at G, s1 and s3 at H, and s2 and s3
at I [Note that s1, s2, s3 are each VNM solutions, as well as the set
of points (G,H,IJ], Next we show that the point M• is in the centered
region delimited by s1, s2 and s3• See Figure 4 .
Proposition �: 
M• belongs to the centered region delimited by s1, s2 and s3•
Proof: It suffices to show that 
d(x2,I) { d(x�,M•), '
By adding these two equations we get: 
= d(x
1
,x3) + d(x2,x3) + d(x
1,A) + dCx2.B) - 2d(x1,x2) 
2 
From the proof of proposition 3 recall that 
Similarly, using the fact that M• e Hl n Hg, we obtain
d(x2,I) { d(x2,M
•), and that M• e H� n Hg' we obtain
d(x
1
,G> { d(x
1
,M•).
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Q,E.D. 
4.2 Solutions 
4.2 . l  Solution to the !-amendment game with certainty 
The following theorem gives the solution to the game described 
in section 3.1 where the bill proposer, or the leader, has the 
information as to who will be the amendment proposer or the follower. 
(i) The point G is the unique limiting outcome as e � 0 of 
the s-Stackelberg equilibrium of the !-amendment game with 
oertainty where player 1 is the leader and player 2 the 
Proof: 
follower. See Figure 5. 
(ii) If player 3 is the follower, then the point H is the 
unique limiting outcome. 
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As we wil l see, the limiting equilibrium strategy for player 1 
is, in (i) the point H and in (ii) the point G. For convenience and 
simplicity of our demonstration we wil l divide the Pareto set (the 
area of the triangle x1x2x3) into several regions. A natural way to 
do so is to consider the regions del imited by the loci H; and H;. 
Indeed, we notice that by the way the locus H; has been constructed, 
for any point to the left of it proposed by player 1, player 2 wil l 
put forward an amendment on the contract curve x2x3• On the other 
hand, for any proposed point to the right of H;, player 2 wil l put 
forward an amendment on the contract curve x1x2• See Figure 6. As to 
the locus H;, for any point proposed by player 1 above it, player 3 
wil l put forward an amendment on x2x3 and for any proposed point below 
it, player 3 will go on x1x3• 
We will then look at the Pareto set as the union of four 
subsets or regions, the areas I1, II1, III1, and IV1, delimited by the 
loci H; and H;. See Figure 7. 
Suppose now that player 2 is the follower. By the previous 
remark for any proposal made by player 1 in regions I1 or IV1, the 
optimizing behavior of player 2 wil l lead to an outcome on the 
contract curve x2x3• 
FIGURE 5: THE POINT G UNIQUE LIMITING OUTCOME OF THE 
ONE AMENDMENT GAME WITH CERTAINTY WHEN PLAYER 1 
IS THE LEADER AND PLAYER 2 THE FOLLOWER. 
FIGURE 6: 
5 
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FOR POINTS TO THE LEFT OF H; PROPOSED BY PLAYER 1 , 
PL AYER 2 WOULD PUT AN AMENDMENT ON x2x3• FOR POINTS 
TO THE RIGHT , PLAYER 2 WOULD GO ON x1x2• 
FIGURE 7: 
5 
x 
REGIONS I1 , II1 , III1 , AND IV1 , DELIMITED BY THE 
LOCI OF POINTS H; AND H; USED IN THE PROOF OF
THEOREMS 1. 1  AND 2. 
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For any point in region II1 or III1 (i.e. , situated to the 
right of H;> player 2 will go on x1x2 but at a point farther away than 
the limiting outcome (G) from player l's ideal point. Similarly, if 
player 3 is the follower, for any proposal made by player 1 in regions 
I1 or 111, the outcome will be on x
2x3• For any point in regions III1 
or IV l ', the resulting outcome is on x1x3, however less desired by 
player 1 than the limiting outcome (H). 
Q,E,D. 
Next, we examine the cases where either player 2 or player 3 
is the leader. 
Theorem 1.i 
(i) The point G is the unique limiting outcome as e � O of 
the e-Stackelberg equilibrium of the 1-amendment game with 
certainty where player 2 is the leader and player 1 the 
follower. If player 3 is the follower then the point I is 
the unique limiting outcome. 
(ii) The point I is the unique limiting outcome as e � O of 
the e-Stackelberg equilibrium of the 1-amendment game with 
certainty where player 3 is the leader and player 1 the 
follower. If player 2 is the follower, then the point H 
is the unique limiting outcome. 
The proof of this theorem utilizes a similar argument as the 
proof of Theorem 1. 1. The reader is referred to section 2.1 of the 
Appendix. 
4.2.2 Solution to the !-Amendment Game with Uncertainty 
The next theorem gives the solution to the 1-amendment game 
with uncertainty. A nice feature of this solution is that it is 
independent of who the leader is. 
Theorem �: The point M
• is the unique limit as e � O e-minimax 
strategy for the leader i e (1,2, 3} in the 1-amendment game with 
uncertainty. 
Proof: We will demonstrate this theorem for the case where i = 1, 
namely when player 1 is the leader. The other oases (i = 2,3) are 
briefly indicated and make use of a similar argument. 
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Note, first that by making a bill proposal in the neighborhood 
of M•, the leader (player 1) induces an outcome in the neighborhood of 
A (if player 2 is the follower) or in the neighborhood of D (if player 
3 is the follower). In either oases player 1 gets the same level of 
utility. See Figure 8. 
Next, we show that if he makes a proposal different from the 
e-minimax "proposal, " then he will be worse off. More specifically, 
it is the case that when at least one of players 2 or 3 puts forward 
an amendment, the resulting outcome from the voting game is less 
desired by the original bill proposer. As seen in the proof of 
Theorem 1.1 the geometric characteristics of the loci H; and H; allow 
us to observe that any proposal by player 1 in regions 11, 111 or IV1 
is not advantageous for him. Indeed, if he proposes a bill in region 
II1, he runs the risk that player 3 is the one who puts forward an
* 
FIGURE 8: M , £-MINIMAX STR ATEGY FOR PLAYER 1 
IN THE ONE AMENDMENT GAME WITH 
UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHO IS THE FOLLOWER. 
5 
x 
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amendment resulting in an outcome on the contract curve x2x3• For 
points in regions rv1, he runs the risk that player 2 is the follower 
which will lead to an outcome on x2x3• Finally for points in region 
2 3 r1, the outcome will be on x x when either of the two players is the 
follower. Now, if player 1 makes a proposal in region III1, the 
outcome will be either on x1x2 (when player 2 is the follower) or on 
x1x3 (when player 3 is the follower). However, in both cases the
outcome is farther away from x1 than the outcome resulting from the 
e-minimax strategy. 
By using regions CI2,II2,III2,IV2J and (I3, rr3,III3, rv3J (see 
the proof of theorem 1. 2 in section 2. 1 of the Appendix) and an 
analogous argument, the remainder of the theorem follows (cases where 
i = 2,3). 
Q.E. D. 
4. 2.3. Solution to the l-Amendment Game with Certainty 
When all players make proposals and the order of the players 
proposing amendments is known to the leader, the following result 
holds, 
Theorem 1_.1 
(i) The point M• is the unique limiting outcome as e -7 0 of 
the s-Stackelberg equilibria of the 2-amendment game with 
certainty where player 1 is the leader and the order of 
the followers is 2,3. 
(ii) If the order of the followers is 3,2 then, the point M• is
still the unique limiting outcome. 
The proof of this theorem is in section 2.2 of the Appendix. 
Theorem 1·1 
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The point M• is the unique limiting outcome as e � O of the e 
Stackelberg equilibria of the 2-amendment game with certainty where 
either player 2 or 3 is the leader and for any ordering of the 
followers. 
The proof of this theorem is analogous to that of theorem 3.1 
21 
S, CONCLUSION 
This paper characterizes the solutions to a number of 
endogenous agenda formation games with three players. Our main result 
' . concerns the importance of the point M in arriving at such solutions. 
In relation to other solution concepts for voting games with 
alternative spaces in ]lm, it is easily shown that: 
(i) M• is in the uncovered set of X; 
(ii) M• is not in general the center of the yolk [McKelvey 
and is omitted. ( 1983)]; 
4.2.4 Solution to the Two Amendment Game with Uncertainty 
Notice from the proof of theorem 3,1 (see section 2,2 of the 
Appendix) that player 1 is indifferent between two alternatives in the 
limit, namely A and D, regardless of the order of the followers. 
Similar observations are true for the cases where either player 2 or 
player 3 is the leader. Therefore, the following result holds. 
Theorem ,i 
(i) The point M• is the limiting outcome as e � O of the e-
minimax-Stackelberg equilibrium of the 2-amendment game 
with uncertainty as to the order of the followers, where 
player 1 is the leader. 
(ii) when player 2 or player 3 is the leader, the point M• is 
still the limiting outcome, 
(iii) M• is not in general the strong point [Grofman, et al. 
(1985)]. 
From a normative point of view, M• has certain attractive features. 
If the ideal points of the three players are equidistant from each 
other, M• is then the barycenter of the Pareto set, giving all players 
equal utility; see Figure 9. As the ideal points become less 
symmetrical, M• tends to the closer pair of ideal points, leaving the 
player whose preferences are less similar in a relatively 
disadvantageous position. Thus, one can argue that, irrespective of 
the institution involved, the point M• provides an equitable solution 
to policy-type games. 
FIGURE 9: THE CASE WHERE THE 3 PLAYERS' IDEAL 
POINTS FORM AN EQUILATERAL TRIANGLE. 
Section !:
APPENDIX 
In this section we give a complete mathematical 
characterization of the point M• . Namely, we give the equations of
the hyperbolas H1, Hz and H3 which contain respectively the loci H�.
- - 1 Hz and H3• 
zz 
We will elaborate in detail the equation of the hyperbola H1, 
The equations of Hz and H3 are derived in an analogous manner, Given
the three voters• ideal points x
1
, xz, and x3 recall that H� was
defined as the locus of points M1 such that: 
3 z 1 3 1 z d(x ,M1) - d(x ,M1) = K1 where K1 = d(x ,x ) - d(x ,x ),
- 1 
, 
Furthermore, H1 contains x and is contained in the area of
the triangle x
1
xZx3 (the Pareto set). This locus H� is a piece of the
complete hyperbola H1 which foci are xz and x
3• The point midway
between xz and x3 is the center of the hyperbola. We denote the
distance between the foci by Zc1 and the difference of the distances 
of any point on H1 from the foci by 2k1• In order to derive the 
equation of H1 we let the line through the foci be the x-axis and the 
center be the origin. z Thus, the coordinates of the foci are x (-c1,o>
3 and x Cc1,o) . Any point M1(x,y) on the curve H1 satisfies:
(Al) 
where in our case the positive sign holds for points to the left of 
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the y-axis and the negative sign for the points to the right. Since 
k1 < c1 (as the difference of two sides of a triangle is less that the 
third side) define: 
(A2) 
Substituting for d (x3, M1) and d (x
2, M1) their values from the distance 
formula in (A l) and using (A2), we obtain the equation of H1 as: 
(A3) 
the lines of equation: 
(A4) 
are the asymptotes of the hyperbola. These equations can be combined 
into a single equation: 
(AS) 
The points I and r• which are the intersections of the hyperbola with 
the x-axis (called the vertices) have coordinates IC-k1, o) and 
I'(k2, o). See Figure A l. 
The equations of H2 and H3 are derived in a similar way and 
are given by: 
(A6) 
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where 
2 3 1 2 2k2 = K2 = d (x , x  ) - d (x , x  ) 
(A7) 
1 3 d (x , x  ) = 2c2 
and 
(AB) 
where 
2 3 1 3 2k3 = K3 = d (x , x  ) - d (x , x  ) 
(A9) 
1 2 d (x , x ) = 2c3• 
The equations of the asymptotes are respectively: 
(A lO) 
and 
(All) 
See Figures A2 and A3. 
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FIGURE A2: THE COMPLETE HYPERBOLA H2 CONTAINING H2
-FIGURE A3: THE COMPLETE HYPERBOLA H3 CONTAINING H3
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Proof of Theorem !.1 
(i) Here player 2 is the bill proposer and when player 1 is 
the follower, the limiting equilibrium strategy for player 
2 is the point I. Consider the loci H; and H;. By 
construction of tt; for any point proposed by player 2 to
the left of H; player 1 would put forward an amendment of 
x1x3 (or at x1 as there will be cases where x1 is in his
effective strategy space).2 For any point to the right
he would go on x1x2• As to H;, player 3 will behave in
the same way as when player 1 is the leader (see theorem 
1 . 1 ). Consider the regions I2, II2, III2 and IV2
delimited by these two loci . See Figure A4 . Now, when 
player 1 is the follower, for any proposed point in 
regions I2 and IV2 player 2 is worse off than at the
limiting outcome. Now, notice that in regions II2 and
III2 the limiting equilibrium "proposal" is his best
alternative. When player 3 is the follower, the limiting 
equilibrium strategy for player 2 is the point G. The 
regions I2 and II2 are not favorable to player 2 as any
point proposed by him will lead to an outcome on x1x3•
Again, from the remaining regions the limiting equilibrium 
proposal is player 2's best strategy. 
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(ii) Player 3 is now the bill proposer. By examining the 
region I3, II3, III3 and IV3 delimited by the loci H; and
H2 (see Figure AS) and applying a similar argument as 
above the results follow . 
Section 1·1 
In what follows, we shall expose in detail the proof of the 
first part of theorem 3 .1 (i), that is when player 1 is the bill 
proposer and the order of the players proposing amendments is known to 
be 2,3. Again, the essence of this result, lies in the geometric 
properties of the point M•. The second part of the theorem follows
from a similar argument. Incidentally, it is quite useful in order to 
understand the results, to notice the symmetry of the problem . 
• • • • As we shall see, in this case x1 = A or x1 = D and x2Cx1 > = B.
The strategy used to demonstrate this theorem is as follows .  Notice 
first that the behavioral assumption of sophistication of the player 
(see section 3.2) implies that the amendment proposed·by player 3 will 
be the outcome. Indeed, recall that for any proposal x1 made by player
1, the effective strategy space for player 2 is PCx1) while for player
3 it is P(x1) n P(x2), i, e, , the set of alternatives that beat x1 and
x2• Thus, the third player's amendment will be the voting outcome.
Given the assumption of euclidean preferences, player 3's equilibrium 
argmin d(x,x3>. Consequently,
xePCx1>nPCx2)
for our two proposed equilibria, it is the case that the voting 
1 
5 
x 
FIGURE A4: REGIONS I2, II2, III2, AND IV2 DELIMITED BY THE LOCI H� AND H; 
USED IN THE PROOF OF THEOREMS 1. 2. ( i) and 2. 
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FIGURE AS: REGIONS I3, II3, III3, AND IV3 DELIMITED BY THE LOCI H1 AND H2
USED IN THE PROOF OF THEOREMS 1.2. (ii) and 2. 
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outcome is within s of M•, Now, player 1 as a leader, makes his 
decision taking into account the optimizing behavior of player 2, his 
immediate follower, which in turn does the same thing as to the 
"rational 11 behavior of player 3, We will therefore investigate the 
best "reaction" function of player 2, Namely, for any point proposed 
by player 1, we will search for the best strategy of player 2 and the 
subsequent voting outcome, Finally, we will show that by proposing a 
point different from the equilibrium strategies (within s of A or D) 
player 1 will induce an outcome less desired by him. 
Figure A6 shows the Pareto set divided into six subsets (or 
regions). For any point in region I proposed by player 1, player 2 
will make an amendment at a point within s of the point G and player 3 
will make an amendment within e of the point I. See Figure A 7  for a 
sample of such points. For any proposal made by player 1 in region V, 
the induced outcome will be on the contract curve x2x3 to the right of 
the point I. For any point in region IV picked by player 1 the 
resulting outcome will be on x2x3 again to the right of I. See Figure 
AS. For any point in region III, the induced outcome will be on 
player l's indifference curve going through that point and below M• or 
else on x2x3 to the right of I. See Figure A9. Now, for any point 
proposed by player 1 in regions II or IV.the induced outcome will be 
on player l's indifference curve passing through that point and a 
player 2's indifference curve which goes through an appropriate point 
in the (1,3) leaf. See Figure A lO. Notice that when player 1 picks 
precisely the equilibrium strategies, namely points within e of A or 
D, the intersection of these two indifference curves will be very 
close to M*. See Figure A l l. This completes the proof, 
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Q. E.D. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Prepared for delivery at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, the New Orleans Hilton, August 29-
September 1, 1985. Copyright by the American Political Science 
Association. We would like to thank Richard McKelvey and Norman 
Schofield for valuable comments and suggestions. 
. - - -
Recall that M = H1 n H2 n H3 (see proposition 1), 
2. This is so whenever the angle x2x1x3 is obtuse, 
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